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JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT DEFENDANTS:
BEYOND "MINIMUM CONTACTS" AND
THE LONG-ARM STATUTES
DAVID E. SEIDELSON*
To what extent may a state court, or a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction,' assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant not served within the state? Ultimately, the perimeter of such
jurisdiction must be determined by constitutional standards. The constitutional limitations which come immediately to mind are the fourteenth
amendment's privileges or immunities2 and due process clauses. 3 The
Supreme Court early determined that the privileges or immunities clause
was not applicable to corporations,4 consequently where the nonresident
defendant is a foreign corporation the limitation of such jurisdiction will
be determined by due process. Moreover, in cases involving nonresident
natural persons, the Court has found no violation of privileges or immunities if the treatment afforded those defendants is not discriminatory as
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. In diversity cases, plaintiff may utilize available state law to effect service upon
the defendant in the federal court proceeding. FED. R. Ciy. P. 4(d)(7). One effect of the
rule is to make state long-arm statutes appropriate means of acquiring jurisdiction in
diversity cases. There is some authority for the proposition that a federal court, even in
a diversity case, should enjoy national jurisdiction, or, stated another way, jurisdiction
over any defendant having "minimum contacts" with the United States. First Flight Co.
v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). However, the precedent value of First Flight is dubious. First, the case involved a federal cause of action
as well as a common law cause, so it was not entirely a diversity action. Second, the case
has not been received warmly by other federal courts. For example, in Weinberg v.
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), the court noted: "A
recent district court decision of interest suggested that the minimum contacts . . . need
only be with the United States as a whole in the federal courts. First Flight Co...
Counsel have not argued this point to the court and that decision is in no way binding
upon this court. Were the court to consider that argument however, it would reject it as
erroneous." Id. at 638, n.3. In the context of this article, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is considered as an "alternative" state court, having the same jurisdiction
as that enjoyed by the state court. "This concept of requiring the federal courts to follow
the jurisdictional lead of the state courts in diversity cases has apparently been adopted
by the vast majority of the federal circuits." Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d
706, 711 (4th Cir. 1966). See Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
2. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856). Although
the French decision antedated the fourteenth amendment, it has been cited by the Court
as authority for the proposition that a state need not admit a corporation within its borders
to do business. Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Washington, 289 U.S. 361 (1933). Cf. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869).
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compared with that which the forum affords its resident defendants.5
Since a state could hardly desire broader jurisdiction than it enjoys over
its own residents,' such decisions of the Court have virtually emasculated
the privileges or immunities clause as a limitation upon the jurisdiction
a state may exercise over nonresident defendants. Apparently, whether
the nonresident defendant is a natural person or a corporation, the due
process clause provides the principal limiting factor in determining the
constitutional propriety of state court jurisdiction. In this context, the
due process clause may be said to consist of two parts, one requiring an
appropriate form of service and the other requiring an adequate justification for the exercise of such jurisdiction; for lack of more descriptive
language, the first may be referred to as procedural due process, the second as substantive due process. In determining whether or not procedural
due process has been complied with in such cases, the Court has fashioned
a standard which requires that the form of constructive service utilized
must be reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with actual notice
of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend.' Registered mail service
directed to the defendant at his last known address, by the forum's secretary of state or the plaintiff or both, consistently has been found sufficient
to meet the required standard.8 A form of service less cumbersome to
the plaintiff would be difficult to conceive. Consequently, the only significant constitutional limitation upon a state court's jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is substantive due process. Once the requirements
of that constitutional mandate are determined, the permissible scope of
such jurisdiction should become apparent.
Unfortunately, the language utilized by the Court in spelling out those
requirements has been rather unspecific, as is sometimes the case when
the Court seeks to verbalize basic constitutional tenets. In some instances,
the very fact that it is a basic constitutional rule which is being expressed
5. "It [Massachusett's nonresident motorist statute] makes no hostile discrimination
against nonresidents, but tends to put them on the same footing as residents. Literal and
precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable; it is not required." Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623

(1935).
6. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
7. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 5; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt.
569, 80 A. 664- (1951). While service upon the secretary of state as "agent" for the nonresident defendant may still be thought by some the equivalent of an in-state service, it is
suggested that the principal practical function of such service is to provide a disinterested
party to forward mail service to the defendant. Where only the plaintiff is required to
mail service to the defendant, there may be some concern over the performance of the chore
by an interested party, although a return receipt should ameliorate the concern. Presumably,
where both plaintiff and the secretary of state are required to mail service to defendant, as
in Vermont's long-arm statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 856 (1963), receipt of such service
by defendant is made more likely by the double mailing.
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may compel general language. In other cases, however, even basic constitutional requirements have been amenable to precise formulations.'
Where specific expression is feasible, it is obviously preferable. The
Court's recitation of that which comports with substantive due process
has been that which does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice; hardly a specific formula which lends itself to ready
application to determine the constitutional propriety of the assertion of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. That which offended such
traditional notions when Pennoyer v. Neff' was decided would hardly
cause a forehead wrinkle today." And determining the necessary elements
of fair play and substantial justice would seem to be as objective and
exact as determining the dimensions of a floor by heel-to-toe measurement. A concise, specific statement of the scope of state court jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants permissible under substantive due process
would be highly desirable. Is it obtainable?
In Hess v. Pawloski," the Court justified the submission of a nonresident motorist to the jurisdiction of the forum in a case arising out
of the operation of the vehicle in the forum state on two grounds: (1)
implied consent, and (2) "Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and,
even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property." 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., Inc.,1 4 annihilated implied consent as a basis for the Hess decision: "The defendant
may protest to high heaven his unwillingness to be sued and it avails him
not."" As for motor vehicles being dangerous machines, the reader is
offered the following language for comparison with that used by the Court
in Hess: "A person who uses an intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose
the person of another to the danger of probable injury, is liable if such
injury results, even though he uses all proper care."' 6 That language,
utilized by a court describing the circumstances in which absolute liability
will be imposed, is strikingly similar to the preceding quotation from
Hess. Does that mean that the Court in Hess approved the assertion of
9. See, e.g., the Court's spelling out of the protection to be afforded one subjected to
custodial interrogation in Miranda v. U.S., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
11. "[Tlhe requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from
the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff . . .to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington...." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
12. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
13. Id. at 356.
14. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
15. Id. at 341.
16. Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Wattrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 565,
79 A.2d 591, 593 (1951).
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jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because he had engaged in
an ultrahazardous activity in the forum state? Of course not. The operation of a motor vehicle is not considered an ultrahazardous activity subjecting the actor to absolute liability, nor was it so considered when Hess
was decided. Yet, in Hess, the Court seemed compelled to characterize
motor vehicles as "dangerous machines" in order to satisfy substantive
due process.
An analogous compulsion apparently gripped the Court in Henry L.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman.1 7 There, the Court approved the assertion
of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had engaged in the
business of selling corporate securities in the forum state, in a cause of
action arising out of that activity. In doing so, the Court cited Hess and
stated that the asserted jurisdiction in Goodman, "goes no farther than
the principle [there] approved. . . ."" How did the Court equate selling

corporate securities with the operation of a dangerous machine? Nothing
to it. In Goodman, the forum state "treat[ed] the business of dealing in
corporate securities as exceptional. ...""9 And how did the Court deter-

mine that Iowa considered such activity "exceptional"?

Iowa had

"subject[ed] it to special regulation . . . [including an] [a]ct [which]

requires registration and written consent for service of process upon the
Secretary of State."" So "exceptional" was given the same due process
magic as "dangerous" had received, and the determination that an activity was exceptional could be based on the existence of a statute in the
forum state requiring one to consent to service upon the forum's secretary of state.
In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,2 plaintiff, a California
resident, there instituted an action against defendant, a corporation
having its principal place of business in Texas, pursuant to a California
statute "which subject[ed] foreign corporations to suit in California on
insurance contracts with residents of that State even though such corporations [could not] be served with process within its borders." 2 Defendant received service by registered mail at its Texas place of business.
The California suit resulted in a judgment for plaintiff. "Unable to collect the judgment in California [plaintiff] went to Texas where she filed
suit on the judgment in a Texas court.123 The Texas courts refused to
extend full faith and credit to the California judgment, finding that the
17. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).

18. Id. at 628.
19. Id. at 627.

20. Id. at 627-28.
21. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
22. Id. at 221.

23. Id.
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issuing court had not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The
Supreme Court reversed. It has been suggested that the primary reason
for reversal was defendant's business-insurance--and the exceptional
nature of that business as indicated by the existence of the California
statute. 4
Just how far a state legislature could go in so labeling activities
"exceptional" was never really determined. Before such approach was
fully exploited, the Court decided International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington.2 5 In International Shoe, the Court said: "[D]ue process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
(emphasis added).26 Since the Court's decision, that italicized phrase has
acquired a mystique and a purported determinative quality far exceeding
any apparent intrinsic meaning it may possess. After all, the Court merely
reiterated that substantive due process would be tested by traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice, and added that for jurisdiction over nonresident defendants the forum could satisfy the test by discovering minimum contacts between defendant and forum state out of
which the action arose. Yet, "minimum contacts" stimulated state legislative activity in a manner not approached by the "exceptional activity"
cases.
The state legislatures reacted with varying alacrity to the International
Shoe decision, but ultimately many of the states did react. The manifestations of their reactions are the "long-arm" statutes.2 7 Some of the
statutes are limited in their applicability to foreign corporations; 28 others
apply to nonresident natural persons as well. 9 Most have been held to
encompass the broadest scope of jurisdiction over nonresidents which due
process permits, although the decisions so holding have differed markedly
24.
25.
26.
27.

Hanson v. Dendia, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316.
For a sampling of the various long-arm statutes extant, see CHEATHAM, GRISWOLD,
REESE & ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 et seq. (5th ed. 1964).
28. E.g., Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 303, § 303.13 subdiv. 1(3) (1957); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 855 (1963); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN., ch. 31, § 71 (1957).

At one time, it may have been thought that such statutes could not be made applicable to
natural persons without violating due process; however, the distinction between foreign
corporations and nonresident natural persons for jurisdictional purposes probably has ceased
to exist. See Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1962); 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
747, 751-52 (1962).
29. E.g., Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1965); New York, N.Y.R. CIv. PRAc.
302. Wisconsin; WIs. STAT. ANN. tit.25, § 262.05 (1963).
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in their determinations of that scopeY° One of the early, and fairly typical, long-arm statutes is that of Vermont. It provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of
Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party in
Vermont, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole
or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such acts
shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont by such foreign
corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment
by such foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of
Vermont . .. to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom
may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings
against such foreign corporation arising from or growing out of
such contract or tort .... 31
With some trepidation, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 2 held that the assertion of jurisdiction
over a Massachusetts corporation whose employees, while reroofing a
house, allegedly committed a tort in Vermont against a Vermont resident,
in an action arising out of that tort, did no violence to due process. As
recently as 1962, a federal district court, taking a more restrictive view
of West Virginia's similar long-arm statute, cited Smyth as the only case
which "permitted an extension of an in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation based on a single tort where there was no other business contact," and concluded that Smyth "does not seem to be sound
law."" While that federal court decision appears contrary to a rather
30. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432,
436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961) ("[Tlhe statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause."); Williams
v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn. 1964) ("[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court
has indicated it will assert its maximum jurisdiction."); Agrasheil, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta
Co., 344 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[W]e shall assume that [New York's long-arm
statute] is as broad as the Federal Constitution would permit it to be.") Despite the last
quoted language, the court in Agrashell was not willing to assert jurisdiction over a Missouri
corporation which had sold 115 tons of walnut shells to a New York partnership. The court
determined that the constitutional propriety of jurisdiction depended on whether or not
"the passage of risk in the sale and carriage of the goods" had occurred in New York.
Id. at 589.
31. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1963). The constructive service portion of the statute
is at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 856 (1963).
32. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). The trepidation is suggested by the following
sentences from the court's opinion: "In the present case no problem of undue hardship is
involved, since it is relatively easy for a Massachusetts corporation to defend in a Vermont
court." 116 Vt. at 574, 80 A.2d at 667. "It has been made apparent already in what has
been written that the instant case can be decided either way on argument from existing
authority." 116 Vt. at 577, 80 A.2d at 669.
33. Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D.W. Va. 1962), construing
W. VA. CoDE, ch. 31, art. 1, § 71 (1957).
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clear trend in the cases, it presaged a circumspective view of the Vermont
statute by the Vermont court in somewhat different circumstances.
In O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.,34 plaintiffs, Vermont residents,
sued defendant, a New York corporation, for injuries resulting from
wife-plaintiff's ingestion of a piece of glass contained in a can of beans
prepared and packed by defendant in New York. Plaintiffs asserted that
the can of beans had been "placed ... in the stream of commerce in New
York . . . [and] purchased by [husband-plaintiff] in Burlington, Vermont. . .. ,"5 The Vermont court found that an assertion of jurisdiction

over the nonresident defendant in O'Brien would violate due process.
The obvious difference between Smyth and O'Brien is that, in the former,
defendant's employees caused injury in the forum state, while in the
latter the injury producing agent was defendant's product. The constitutional significance of that distinction, as seen by the court, was that
the mere presence of defendant's product in Vermont was not sufficient
to demonstrate an "intentional and affirmative action on the part of the
non-resident defendant in pursuit of its corporate purposes within this
jurisdiction." 6 "The bare allegation that defendant at . . . New York
put its product 'into the stream of commerce,' without more, is insufficient to show a voluntary contract or an intentional participation in
Vermont." 37 So "minimum contacts" was equated with "intentional participation," and the Vermont court, "unlike the Supreme Court of Illinois
in Gray v. American Radiator& Standard Sanitary Corp.," was unwilling
to "infer that the defendant's products have substantial use and consumption in Vermont." 3
In the Gray 9 case, plaintiff, an Illinois resident, was injured when a
water heater exploded in Illinois. Titan Valve Manufacturing Co., a
foreign corporation, had constructed the heater's safety valve, allegedly
in a negligent manner, in Ohio and sold the valve to American Radiator,
which incorporated the valve into the heater in Pennsylvania. Ultimately,
34. 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
35. 123 Vt. at 462, 194 A.2d at 569. Upon remand, plaintiffs amended the complaint
to allege that, after packing the can of beans, defendant sold it to International Grocers
Alliance for resale and distribution to grocers in Vermont and other states. The amendment
satisfied the jurisdictional requisites. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212
A.2d 69 (1965).
36. 123 Vt. at 464, 194 A.2d at 570.
37. 123 Vt. at 465, 194 A.2d at 571.
38. 123 Vt. at 465, 194 A.2d at 571. This unwillingness is especially interesting in light
of the fact that students from the New England area in the author's Conflict of Laws classes
invariably recognize "Comstock Foods" as a popular brand name. One might imagine that
something so generally known in the area would have been an appropriate subject for
judicial notice.
39. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Mll. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 761
(1961).
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the heater "was sold to an Illinois consumer."4 That was Titan's "only
contact with [Illinois]."' The Supreme Court of Illinois, after paying
homage to InternationalShoe and Smyth, concluded that "it is a reasonable inference that [Titan's] commercial transactions, like those of other
manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State."42
That said, the court concluded that jurisdiction over Titan was constitutionally appropriate. Now, "minimum contacts" was equated with
"substantial use and consumption" in the forum state. And such substantial use and consumption apparently could be inferred from the presence
of one of defendant's products in the state, at least in Illinois. While the
difference between a can of beans and a water heater safety valve is
obvious, the legal significance of that difference is not. The sale of each
to a consumer within the forum state benefits the manufacturer of each,
since each sale of the manufacturer's product enlarges its potentially
profitable manufacturing capacity. That economic advantage exists
whether the product is sold as an entity or as an integrated component
of a larger product. If a legally significant difference between O'Brien
and Gray cannot be found, one is impelled toward the conclusion that
one of those decisions was wrong.
In O'Brien, the Vermont court was unwilling to conclude that defendant's can of beans had come to be purchased in Burlington through
some intentional act of defendant. It may be helpful to attempt to determine some of the various ways in which the beans came to be purchased
there. Several possibilities exist: defendant made its beans available to
an exclusive distributor in Vermont; 4" defendant made its beans available to a number of distributors in Vermont; defendant made its beans
available to a distributor in New England (outside Vermont), who in
turn made them available to wholesalers in Vermont; defendant made
its beans available to one or more distributors in New York, who in turn
made them available to wholesalers in Vermont; defendant made its
beans available directly to a retail outlet in Vermont; or defendant made
its beans available directly to plaintiffs. Whichever of these possibilities
existed in fact, it seems fair to conclude that defendant benefited from
the purchase of its can of beans in Vermont since such purchase potentially enlarged defendant's profitable manufacturing capacity. Moreover,
it would seem appropriate to infer that defendant intended to acquire
such benefit. Apparently, the Vermont court was wrong. Was the Illinois
40. 22 Il. 2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
41. 22 II. 2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
42. 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.

43. The existence of an exclusive distributor within the forum state, and the control
factors inherent therein, have been considered critical to the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over the foreign corporation defendant. Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney
Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964). As to the

manner in which the beans actually came to be purchased in Vermont, see note 35 supra.
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court correct? Not necessarily. Why infer substantial use and consumption of defendant's product in Illinois (especially from a record which
led the court to note that "defendant's only contact with this state is
found in the fact that a product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated
in Pennsylvania, into a hot water heater which in the course of commerce was sold to an Illinois consumer")" if such a gross inference is
unnecessary? The Illinois sale of the single water heater containing defendant's component would appear sufficient to justify the conclusion
that defendant had enjoyed economic benefit from the Illinois market.
That single sale potentially enlarged defendant's profitable manufacturing
capacity, and presumably defendant intended to receive such economic
advantage.
In O'Brien, the court, apparently willing to assert jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant upon a showing that one of its products was
intended for Vermont, was unwilling to find the requisite intent from
the actual purchase in Vermont. In Gray, the court, apparently unwilling
to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant upon a showing that
one of its products was used in Illinois, was willing to infer substantial
use and consumption of defendant's products in Illinois." In O'Brien,
the essence of "minimum contacts" seems to have been intent; in Gray,
quantity. Thus, the highest appellate courts of two states differed in their
interpretation of that mystical phrase from International Shoe. Such
divergence isn't surprising in light of the fact that the last time the
Supreme Court of the United States directed its attention to jurisdiction
over a nonresident based on minimum contacts, the Court divided 5-4
with two separate dissenting opinions. That division of the Court, in
Hanson v. Denckla,46 further attests to the lack of inherent determinative
44. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d
at 764.
45. For a discussion approving of the "substantial use and consumption" test, see Note,
34 Gao. WAsE. L. Rav. 544 (1966).
46. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). It is suggested that one of the principal reasons for the Court's
difficulty in Hanson was the fact that the case involved a determination of the validity of
a trust. It is apparent that if trusts are to perform their contemplated legal functions the
trustee must have access to a forum which has jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the trust and to have that determination given binding effect as to all who may claim
pursuant to or against the trust, so long as they are given on appropriate form of constructive service. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 469, 246 N.W. 1 (1932).

The Court has recognized that "the interest of each state in . . . trusts that exist by the
grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the
interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard. . . . [T]he vital interest of the State in bringing any issues
as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Yet in First Trust Co., supra, the court felt

compelled to justify its power to determine the validity of a Minnesota trust on the basis
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quality in "minimum contacts." Perhaps the single sentence in the three
Hanson opinions most worthy of reliance is that one referring to the
future of the diminishing restrictions imposed upon the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: "Yet further relaxation seems
certain." 47
One wonders how 'the Illinois Supreme Court would react to a situation
in which the nonresident defendant had engaged in a calculated, expensive-but unsuccessful-program of saturation advertising aimed at
securing substantial use and consumption of its product in Illinois. If,
despite the advertising campaign, only one or relatively few of defendant's products were actually sold in Illinois, and one of the products so
sold caused injury to the Illinois purchaser, would the Illinois court decline to assert jurisdiction over the defendant in an action brought by
the injured purchaser, because there had been no substantial use or consumption within the state? On the basis of such a record, the "reasonable
inference" employed in the Gray case would be impossible. Yet, a declination of jurisdiction would hardly seem justified. Similarly, one may
wonder how the Vermont court would respond to a case in which thousands of nonresident-defendant's products were sold in Vermont, with
resulting injury to one of the Vermont purchasers, but no evidence was
offered as to the distributive chain which preceded the Vermont sale.
Would the court remain unwilling to infer an intentional participation in
the Vermont market on the part of defendant? Or would the presence
of thousands of defendant's products in Vermont compel the court to
conclude that defendant had voluntarily entered the Vermont market?
If the court would be compelled to such an inference, apparently its decision in O'Brien was predicated on a conclusion that the sale of defendant's can of beans from a grocer's shelf in Burlington was an extraordinary, isolated event. Such a conclusion would seem rather extraordinary,
and contrary to the general merchandizing methods of food retailers.
The Gray decision was described as "a thoughtful opinion" by a federal district court in Minnesota which found itself "in agreement with
the Gray analysis. 48 In Williams v. Connolly, plaintiff, a California
of in rem jurisdiction, and devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to demonstrating
that bearer bonds, the principal corpus of the trust, constituted an appropriate res. And
in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, one of the dissenting opinions (Mr. Justice Black, joined by
Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Brennan) cited Mullane, supra, as authority for the
proposition that Florida could determine the validity of a trust and have its determination
given binding effect as to the Delaware trustee which was never personally before the
Florida court.
It is submitted that an action to determine the validity of a trust should be considered
a non-transitory action, cognizable only in a forum of the trustee's domicile, and that that
forum should be deemed to have in personam jurisdiction over all who claim under or
against the trust, provided they receive appropriate constructive service.
47. Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 46 at 260.
48. Williams v. Connolly, 277 F. Supp. 539, 546 (D. Minn. 1964).
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resident, was injured when a heater exploded in a motel room in Minne.. ,the Northern States Power Company, Skelly Oil Company, Stewart-Warner Corporation, and the BastionMorely Company.1 49 Bastion-Morely, served pursuant to Minnesota's
long-arm statute, 0 moved to quash the service. The court thereupon
undertook the two-step task of determining (1) if the long-arm statute
was applicable to the facts, and (2) if so, whether or not its application,
and the consequent assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, would be constitutionally appropriate.
sota. He sued "the motel owner .

The first step posed an interesting problem. The long-arm statute provided for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation making "a contract with
a resident of Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in Minnesota . . . in any actions . . . against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract. . . ,, ' The statute

did not expressly require that the foreign corporation contract with the
plaintiff or that the plaintiff be a resident of Minnesota. Plaintiff asserted
that his "complaint states a cause of action based on breaches of warranty and the warranties extend to the plaintiff. The warranty actions
would be viewed as arising from or growing out of the contract."5 2
"Assuming a contract between Bastion-Morely and a Minnesota resident,"5 " presumably the motel owner, the statute was applicable to the
facts if privity was not necessary to maintain a warranty action and if
the warranties from defendant extended to plaintiff. The court determined
that Minnesota no longer required privity in warranty actions, and that
plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of any warranties imposable upon
Bastion-Morely. Thus, the court determined, the long-arm statute was
applicable to the assumed facts. It then became "necessary to consider
whether such jurisdiction would violate the due process clause of the
' 54
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court cited and quoted from International Shoe, McGee, and
Hanson v. Denckla. Then the court noted its "agreement with the Gray
analysis."5 5 Here is the Minnesota federal court's version of the Gray
analysis:
A corporation placing its products in the stream of national
commerce is in a very real sense availing itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within each state its products may ultimately enter. In addition to whatever direct reliance on the
49. Id. at 540.
50. MDMN. STAT. ANN. ch. 33, § 303.13, subdiv. 1(3)
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 33, § 303.13, subdiv. 1(3)

52.
53.
54.
55.

Williams v. Connolly, supra note 48 at 541.

Id.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 546.

(1957).
(1957).
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laws of a State might be necessary in any particular case, benefits from a national commerce depend upon an ordered legal
system in each State making up the nation, and one who participates in this commerce takes advantage of the ordered system of laws prevailing in all fifty States. Under such circumstances the State, which as a practical matter must open its
borders to this commerce, has an important interest in providing a forum for its injured residents. 6
That language is interesting for several reasons. First, contrary to
O'Brien, it suggests that the placing of a product in commerce may be
sufficient to submit a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of plaintiff's home forum. Second, it intimates that any state may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant engaged in interstate commerce,
regardless of the extent of the use or consumption of defendant's product
at the forum, and, apparently, absent any specific intent on the part of
defendant to benefit from that forum's laws, in an action arising out of
the use of defendant's product in the forum. This judicial recognition
that one engaging in national commerce depends on an ordered system
of laws, a totality necessarily contributed to by every state, adds a new
dimension to "minimum contacts." Finally, the quotation concludes with
a state's interest "in providing a forum for its injured residents," despite
the fact that the plaintiff in Williams was not a resident of the forum.
Williams is not unique in its consideration of subjecting a foreign corporation to jurisdiction in an action commenced by a non-resident plaintiff. In Elkhart Engineering Corporation v. Dornier Werke,5 7 plaintiff, a
Wisconsin corporation, sued defendant, a German corporation, in Alabama, under that state's "non-qualifying corporation" statute." Plaintiff
sought to recover for damage to an aircraft it had purchased from defendant, caused while defendant's agents were demonstrating the plane in
Alabama with plaintiff's permission. The court found that the statute was
applicable, and that its application did not offend due process. In reaching its conclusion, the court moved from Pennoyer through Hess, International Shoe, McGee, Hanson, and Smyth. It expressly minimized the
significance of the "dangerous" nature of the activity conducted within
the forum state, so emphasized by Hess, and implicitly negated any requirement that plaintiff be a resident of the forum. The court determined
that "a state has a substantial interest in providing a forum to redress
'
tortious injuries committed within its borders by non-residents." 59
The
court did not indicate the specific elements of that "substantial interest."
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965).
CoDE OF ALA., Tit. 7, § 199(1) (1961).
343 F.2d at 868.
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To a limited extent, Mr. Justice Goldberg implicitly negated any requirement that plaintiff be a resident of the forum state in order to utilize
its long-arm statute. In Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Company,6 0
plaintiff, a Maine corporation (but one having "a substantial plant in
New York") , 1 used New York's long-arm statute62 to obtain service
upon defendant, a United States citizen, in Rome. The alleged operative
facts of the case were stated succinctly by Mr. Justice Goldberg:
[O]ne Fox, employed by appellee [American Cyanamid] at its
New York plant, stole from appellee biological cultures and confidential documents pertaining to the production of some newly
developed antibiotics; Fox went to Italy, where he conspired
with appellant [Rosenblatt] and officials of an Italian pharmaceutical company to arrange a sale of the stolen material to the
Italian company for use in the production of antibiotics in competition with those of appellee; pursuant to this conspiracy, appellant flew to New York to inspect the material for the Italian
firm, and being satisfied, purchased it, paying part of the purchase price in New York, and returned with it to Italy."
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that application of
New York's long-arm statute would offend due process. After defendant
exhausted state court procedures without avail, he applied to Mr. Justice
Goldberg "for a stay of the judgment of the [New York] Court of Appeals pending his appeal to [the Supreme Court of the United States.]" 6 4
In deciding whether or not to grant the stay, Mr. Justice Goldberg had to
determine "whether plenary review by this Court of appellant's constitutional claim is likely; if so, a stay should be granted. '65 Mr. Justice Goldberg denied the stay.
Of special interest are those aspects of the case which defendant asserted made it constitutionally inappropriate to apply New York's longarm statute to him:
He contends that appellee is a Maine corporation, that appellant is not a corporation, that appellant is in a foreign country,
that the appellee is a "half-billion" dollar corporation with access to Italian courts, that the "center of gravity" of the alleged
conspiracy is in Italy, that the key witness for appellee is "completely within the control" of appellee, that appellant might be
60. 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 110, pet. for rehearing denied, 382
U.S. 1002 (1965).
61. 86 S. Ct. at 2 (1965).
62. N.Y. CPLR § 302 (McKinney 1966).
63. 86 S. Ct. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3.
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subject to a second suit in Italy, and that appellee's property
had been stolen by Fox before appellant was involved in the
transfer.6 6
Mr. Justice Goldberg's response was direct:
These facts are not relevant . . . to the jurisdiction of New
York which is plainly supportable, as far as due process is concerned, on appellant's conduct in New York. They relate only
to questions of convenience and not to jurisdiction in a constitutional sense. For the purposes of this appeal it is conceded
that Fox stole the material from appellee's place of business in
New York, and that pursuant to a conspiracy to convert appellant flew to New York, effected the tortious transfer, and paid a
substantial part of the purchase price to Fox in New York. This
is more than sufficient to meet the constitutional test as enunciated in our decisions."
The in-Chambers opinion in Rosenblatt suggests that a long-arm statute may be utilized to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in
an action brought by a nonresident plaintiff, and that the relative convenience or inconvenience of such jurisdiction is irrelevant to its constitutional propriety. There may be at least a modicum of inconsistency in
those two conclusions. Where the plaintiff is a nonresident of the forum
state, what justifiable interest has that state in asserting jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendant? The classic concern of the forum for its own
residents is lacking. Perhaps the interest lies in regulating conduct within
the state; certainly in Rosenblatt the acts which allegedly occurred in
New York-theft and purchase of stolen material-are acts which New
York would have a legitimate interest in regulating, or, more specifically,
prohibiting. But the propriety of an assertion of jurisdiction in a civil
action as a means of regulating conduct within the state is somewhat
dubious. Where the conduct is criminal, as well as civilly actionable-as
was the case in Rosenblatt-the state's ability to prosecute would seem
to provide an adequate method of regulation, to the extent that conduct
may be regulated by subsequently imposed judicial sanctions. Where the
conduct is not criminal, but merely civilly actionable, imposition of jurisdiction as a means of regulation becomes questionable for a couple of
more reasons. First, the state's concern with regulation of conduct presumably diminishes as the degree of culpability of the conduct deescalates
from criminal to civil wrong. Second, and more significant, to the extent
that the state has an appropriate interest in the activity or consequences
thereof which occurred within its borders, presumably its law will be
applied by whatever court entertains the civil action. Thus, to whatever
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id.
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degree conduct may be regulated by the after-the-fact imposition of law,
that regulation will occur even absent an assertion of jurisdiction by a
court sitting in the state where the conduct occurred.
If the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is not a
necessary (or even wholly appropriate) means of regulating activity or
consequences thereof occurring within the forum state, what justification
exists for such an assertion of jurisdiction? With due deference to the
contrary indication of Mr. Justice Goldberg, it is suggested that the
primary justification is convenience.
Simple candor compels recognition of the fact that litigation in a foreign court does impose tangible and intangible inconveniences upon the
litigant. That same candor should suggest that the overriding reason for
permitting a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in any circumstances exists in the recognition of, and desire to
alleviate, that inconvenience which would otherwise be imposed upon the
plaintiff. Why else permit the resident plaintiff to sue locally the nonresident motorist, security salesman, insurer, roofer, or safety valve manufacturer? Whatever validity may have existed for the justification of such
jurisdiction in terms of regulation of conduct or consequences within the
forum state, has been reduced to near nihility since "the Ice Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence . . . [entered] an advanced stage of thaw.""8

That thawing process has progressed sufficiently that it may be asserted
that, to the extent a state has an appropriate interest in the regulation of
conduct, its dispositive law will be utilized to resolve those issues dealing
with such conduct regulation wherever the case is heard. 69 Moreover, in
those jurisdictions which have eschewed an interest oriented approach to
fashioning indicative laws, the dispositive law of the state wherein the
conduct occurred is likely to be used to resolve nearly all of the issues of
the case, as a consequence, for example, of a rigid adherence to lex Zoci
delicti in tort cases. 70 Thus, application of the regulatory law of the state
in which the conduct occurred seems likely regardless of which state
becomes the forum.
Given a potential plaintiff in one state and a potential defendant in
another, if plaintiff is to have the opportunity of asserting his claim
68. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963).
69. See, e.g., Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 67; Griffith v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Tramontana v. Varig Airlines, 350 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 943 (1966) ; Armiger v. Real S.A. Transportes Aereos,
377 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., Inc., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); White
v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). Maryland's adherence to lex loci delicti has
been characterized as "conclusively . . . obsolete." 27 MD. L. REv. 85, 88 (1967).
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judicially, one of the parties must have imposed upon him the inconvenience inherent in litigation in a foreign court. In essence, then, the
question of the propriety of asserting jurisdiction becomes a matter of
determining which of the parties should be compelled to bear that inconvenience. The appropriate answer would seem to be the defendant. Unless one is willing to assume that the plaintiff's claim is wholly spurious,
the assertion of such claim indicates that, as a result of certain action or
inaction on the part of defendant or plaintiff or both, the plaintiff has
suffered an actionable wrong at the hands of the defendant. "The usual
presumption is that a person submits a claim in good faith. To conclude
otherwise requires a resort to speculation and reliance upon suspicion.""
Moreover, the presumption that plaintiff's claim is asserted in good faith
would seem to rest on a rather sound factual basis. Typically, a condition
precedent to the actual assertion of the claim will be consultation with
cunsel. During the course of that consultation, counsel and plaintiff will
reach certain conclusions as to the substance of the claim. If the claim is
found to be lacking in substance to the extent that it is not even colorably
valid, economics will militate against assertion of the claim. If the case is
one in which counsel will expect a retainer plus additional fees for subsequent services, very likely plaintiff, now aware of the lack of validity of
his imagined claim, will balk at paying the necessary fees. Should the
case be one in which counsel ordinarily would serve on a contingent fee
basis, counsel, aware of the lack of validity of plaintiff's claim, is not
likely to proceed. In addition, basic morality and ethics would seem to
militate against the formal assertion of the spurious claim. It may be
that plaintiff, once advised that his imagined wrong does not amount to
legal injury, will experience a diminution of his sense of moral indignation, as well as his appetite for costly litigation. Hopefully, counsel will
realize an ethical restraint from prosecuting such a claim. In short, it
seems quite appropriate to presume that when a claim is asserted formally such assertion is bona fide. Therefore, at least in limine, plaintiff
presumably is the wronged party and defendant the wrongdoer. If one
must bear the inconvenience of a foreign forum, apparently it should be
the defendant.
It is submitted, then, that when plaintiff asserts a transitory cause of
action against a nonresident defendant in plaintiff's home forum, due
process should not be deemed violated if the forum exercises in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. And, it is submitted, that such
jurisdiction should be deemed constitutionally appropriate even absent
any other "minimum contacts" existing between defendant and the forum
state. The overriding "contact"-if one requires that word to be usedexists in the mere assertion of resident plaintiff's claim. That assertion,
71. Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds on
rehearing, 380 F.2d 310 (1967).
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presumably valid, indicates that defendant, by his acts or omissions, has
incurred a legal liability to the plaintiff, and that presumed liability to
the plaintiff should justify plaintiff's use of his home forum and defendant's subjection to that forum for determination of the existence and
extent of the asserted liability. The assertion of jurisdiction by plaintiff's
home forum over nonresident defendant should not be deemed to deprive
defendant of liberty or property without due process of law. It merely
provides plaintiff with the convenience of a local forum and subjects defendant to the inconvenience of litigation in a foreign, yet competent,
court. Such a statement of due process requirements in the jurisdictional
context here under examination has two distinct advantages over International Shoe's "minimum contacts": (1) it is readily expressed and
easily applied even in varying factual situations, and (2) it is consistent
with and effectively implements the basic consideration of convenience
which underlies the permissible assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
What consequences flow from this proposed statement of due process
requirements? For one thing, the various state long-arm statutes, to the
extent that they provide a local forum for the resident plaintiff, would
appear to be too restrictive in requiring additional contacts between defendant and the forum state. Even the nebulous minimum contact of
committing a tort in whole or in part in the forum against a resident of
the forum or making a contract with a resident of the forum to be performed in whole or in part by either party within the forum will serve to
deprive the resident plaintiff of the convenience of a local forum in some
instances. In those cases where the additional statutory contacts do not
exist, the wronged plaintiff, rather than the presumed wrongdoer-defendant, will be compelled to bear the inconvenience of trial in a foreign
court. To the extent that it is constitutionally appropriate to subject a
nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of plaintiff's local forum, regardless of where the operative facts underlying plaintiff's cause of action
occurred, the long-arm statutes may restrict rather than enlarge the permissible scope of juricdiction.
An interesting example of such potential effect of a long-arm statute
arose in St. Clair v. Righter.72 There, plaintiff, a resident of Virginia,
sued defendants, nonresidents of Virginia, for libel allegedly arising out
of the publication in Virginia of certain letters written and mailed by
defendants outside of Virginia. Jurisdiction was asserted under Virginia's
long-arm statute, which provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from
the person's
72. 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966).
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(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this
State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside this State if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this State
(emphasis added)

;73

The court found that section (4) was the only one having potential apnrtius nj ury within the
act causi
plicability to an u d
state, then determined that section (4) was inapplicable to the specific
case because the complaint failed to allege facts which would support the
conclusion that the "contacts" required by the italicized portion of that
section existed. Thus, the court found that plaintiff's case was without
the coverage of the long-arm statute. One might suppose that that finding
would have led to the granting of defendants' motion to dismiss. It did
not. The court determined that the long-arm statute did not describe the
metes and bounds of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction; rather, it
determined that the limits of such jurisdiction depended upon the due
process clause. The court viewed the long-arm statute as "merely legislative approval for the exercise by the courts of that state of their inherent
jurisdictional power at least to the limits set out in the statute ....
[T]his does not restrict the courts and prohibit them from extending
their jurisdiction to the limits of due process even if such an assumption
of latent power is not expressly authorized by the statute."7 4 Thereupon,
the court found that assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants in the circumstances of the case did not violate due process.
The court's treatment of Virginia's long-arm statute as "merely legislative approval" for the exercise of a portion of a greater inherent jurisdiction, and, thus, not restrictive of that greater inherent jurisdiction, is
dubious at best. It would seem a fair assumption that the legislature in
enacting the statute intended to describe the permissible scope of jurisdiction which Virginia courts were to assert over nonresident defendants.
It may well be true that the restrictions imposed by section (4) were
thought by the legislature to be required by due process. It may also be
true that the legislature was unduly restrictive in its determination of the
scope of jurisdiction permissible under due process. Both of these as73. VA. CODE tit.8, § 8-81.2 (1964).
74. 250 F. Supp. at 152.

1967-1968]

JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT DEFENDANTS

239

sumptions, however, fall short of supporting the conclusion that the
statute does not define the limits of jurisdiction available to Virginia
courts. That conclusion is supportable only to the extent that state courts
enjoy jurisdiction absent legislative grant and beyond legislative grant
where such a grant exists. Inherent jurisdiction absent statutory grant is
probably a supportable position. The creation of a court by state constitution or legislative enactment probably creates some inherent jurisdiction oaf the part of the court. Even if statutes specifically grant to the
court jurisdiction over certain matters and are silent as to other matters,
jurisdiction over those other matters may be arguable. However, where
the legislature specifically defines the extent of jurisdiction in a particular context, e.g., jurisdiction over nonresident defendants not served
within the forum, it would seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
support a broader jurisdiction within that context. To do so, would
amount to "judicial legislation," a practice expressly disavowed by the
court in St. Clair.75 It would amount, also, to the reading of statutory
language as precatory only, and not mandatory; such judicial disregard
of legislative enactments would seem improper. Consequently, while the
inherent jurisdiction relied upon by the St. Clair court might be appropriate absent legislation on the point, its creation in the face of contrary
legislation directly in point seems inappropriate. Nonetheless, the case
does present a set of facts wherein the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants would be constitutionally appropriate, but the state's
long-arm statute, if utilized, would preclude such jurisdiction. Although
some of those factors relied on by the court to justify jurisdiction constitutionally-infliction of injury within the forum, purposeful mailing
into the forum, and probable application of the forum's dispositive law76
-go beyond the author's suggestion that plaintiff's residence within the
forum is itself sufficient to justify jurisdiction constitutionally, the case
demonstrates rather forcefully that a long-arm statute, even though intended to enlarge jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, may serve to
restrict that jurisdiction. If the author's suggestion that the mere fact
of plaintiff's residence within the forum state offers adequate constitutional justification for the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, because of the propriety of imposing the burden of a foreign
court upon defendant rather than upon plaintiff, be accepted, virtually all
of the long-arm statutes have a restrictive, rather than enlarging, effect
upon such jurisdiction.
What, then, should be done in those states which have long-arm statutes and which desire to have their courts enjoy the maximum jurisdic75. Id. "(The court expresses no opinion with regard to the situation where a legislature
has expressly stated that the courts of that state are not to exercise jurisdiction beyond the
limits defined in the statute, as that is not the case here.)"
76. Id. at 154-155.
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tion permissible under due process, as that jurisdiction is herein described? Two courses of action suggest themselves: first, repeal the
long-arm statutes after creating a legislative history sufficient to indicate
the purpose of repeal; and, second, and probably preferable, amend the
long-arm statutes to provide for jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
in all transitory causes of action brought by resident plaintiffs. In those
jurisdictions without long-arm statutes, two analogous approaches could
be taken. Absent any legislative action, the courts could determine that
they enjoy inherent jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in actions
brought by resident plaintiffs to the extent permissible under due process.
Assuming due process permits such jurisdiction in all such transitory
actions, the courts could exercise it. The second, and seemingly preferable,
approach would be enactment of a long-arm statute expressly providing
for such jurisdiction.
In each circumstance, it has been suggested that the existence of a
long-arm statute expressly providing for such jurisdiction would be preferable to a judicial exercise of such inherent jurisdiction absent statutory
enactment. That conclusion arises from an examination of the functions
of long-arm statutes and the judicial treatment afforded those statutes.
Certain of those functions seem not very critical. For example, while
it may be said that enactment of such statutes would serve to make residents aware of the scope of jurisdiction available to them in their courts
more readily than would judicial decisions, the assertion is not very persuasive. Whether the broader jurisdiction here suggested arises from
statutory or decisional law, it will become known rather quickly to the
practicing bar, and it is the bar which, in fact, will make it known generally to residents having claims against nonresidents. Similarly, it might
be asserted that enactment of the statute might provide effective notice to
nonresidents who might be or become potential defendants in plaintiff's
local forum, so that judicial exercise of such jurisdiction does not "take
them by surprise." But that assertion is not very persuasive either. Judicial exercise of such jurisdiction absent statutory authority would "surprise" only the first defendant subjected to it. Like any innovation or
change resulting from decisional law, it would become generally known
rather quickly. Moreover, even the first defendant subjected to such
jurisdiction by judicial decision rather than legislative enactment would
be able to "cushion" or delay the surprise by challenging the asserted
jurisdiction in court. While this delay would come too late to affect that
conduct of defendant which gave rise to the cause of action, assuming
that conduct is readily affected by a subsequent assertion of jurisdiction,
it would permit defendant to make present plans for trial at the foreign
court. And, it should be remembered, even this cushioned surprise will
affect only the first defendant subjected to such jurisdiction. Should it be
suggested that the assertion of such jurisdiction over the first nonresident
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defendant-or any nonresident defendant who had not contemplated it
-violates due process in that defendant could not have anticipated such
jurisdiction at the time the operative facts occurred, the suggestion may
be negated by language of the Court in McGee, specifically directed to
California's statute but equally applicable to the assertion of inherent
jurisdiction:
The statute was remedial, in the purest sense of that term,
and neither enlarged nor impaired respondent's substantive
rights or obligations under the contract. It did nothing more
than to provide petitioner with a California forum to enforce
whatever substantive rights she might have against respondent.
At the same time respondent was given a reasonable time to appear and defend on the merits after being notified of the suit.
Under such circumstances
it had no vested right not to be sued
77
in California.
That which seems to make statutory enactment of such jurisdiction
preferable to judicial creation is a very practical consideration. Despite
the apparent overzealousness of the St. Clair court, recent history demonstrates a judicial dalliance with "minimum contacts" and its many and
diverse "equivalents"-intent, substantial use and consumption, conduct
regulation, dispositive law application-which suggests that if the broader
scope of jurisdiction permissible under due process suggested here is to
be realized in the near future, legislative action is likely to be the more
effective stimulus. Legislative fashioning of such a long-arm statute seems
to pose no serious problem. In fact, New Jersey's existing court rule could
serve as a model:
[Whenever] an individual cannot be served in this state ...
then, consistent with due process of law, service may be made
by ... registered mail . . . to his . .. usual place of abode."
It will be noted that the language of the rule would appear applicable
not only to actions commenced in New Jersey by New Jersey plaintiffs
against nonresident defendants, but also to actions commenced in New
Jersey by nonresident plaintiffs against nonresident defendants. That
potential applicability, along with a sense of logic and good order, suggests an examination and analysis of the constitutional propriety of such
jurisdiction. To this point, it has been submitted that due process would
not be offended in any instance where a resident plaintiff brought a transitory cause of action in his home forum against a nonresident defendant.
Would due process tolerate the bringing of such an action by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident defendant in some other forum of
the plaintiff's choosing?
77. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
78. N.J.R.R. 4:4-4(j).
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Three of the cases noted hereinabove involved the bringing of such
action by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident defendant: Williams, Elkhart, and Rosenblatt. In the latter two cases the assertion of
jurisdiction was approved; in Williams, it was disapproved only because
of plaintiff's failure to assert facts wholly unrelated to his residence. In
each of those cases, however, a significant portion of the operative facts
occurred in the forum state. In each, the asserted jurisdiction was predicated, at least in part, upon that state's interest in providing a forum for
cases arising out of wrongful acts committed within its borders. The
jurisdiction contemplated here is one asserted in a forum state in which,
conceivably, none of the operative facts occurred. To attempt to determine the propriety of such jurisdiction, it would be appropriate to examine Williams, Elkhart, and Rosenblatt to determine (1) how significant
the forum's interest is where the wrongful act occurred within its borders,
arI1
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In Williams, that which occurred in the forum state was the explosion
of a heater and plaintiff's consequent injury. The nonresident defendant
which challenged the court's jurisdiction was a corporation which had
contributed to the manufacturing of the heater. Its alleged culpable conduct occurred outside the forum state. To the extent that jurisdiction is
to be limited by the situs of defendant's activity, the corporation's activity
did not justify the forum's contemplated jurisdiction. Of course, the court
assumed, arguendo and temporarily, a contract between the corporation
and the local motel owner, and it was that contract which served as the
potential basis of jurisdiction.7 9 One might assert that by exercising jurisdiction in such circumstances, the court acquired some capacity to regulate the corporate activity which preceded the contract or the contract
itself. Frankly, it is difficult to imagine that Bastion-Morely's activities
in making heaters or selling heaters would be muct affected by the assertion of jurisdiction over Bastion-Morely by a court sitting in Minnesota.
This is not intended as an adverse reflection upon those courts sitting in
Minnesota; the same could be said of courts sitting in any state. Rather,
it is intended to suggest that the assertion of jurisdiction by any court
over Bastion-Morely is not likely to have much impact upon that company's manufacturing or marketing methods. The possibility of successful litigation against the company might affect its business operations,
but that possibility exists regardless of which forum entertains the litigation. It is the economic impact of a money judgment which may persuade
a company to amend certain of its business practices, not the assertion of
jurisdiction over the company.
79. It could be argued that the significance of the assumed contract was to afford the
court a reason for providing a local forum for defendant motel owner against his warrantor,
Bastian-Morely. As between those two parties it would be appropriate to characterize the
motel owner as a local plaintiff and Bastian-Morely as a nonresident defendant. Jurisdiction
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How significant is it that the consequences of the company's allegedly
culpable conduct were suffered in the forum state? Bearing in mind that
plaintiff was a nonresident, the interest of a state in providing a convenient local forum for the redress of grievances suffered by its residents
is lacking. It could be asserted that Minnesota had an appropriate interest
in providing a forum for the litigation in order to make any recovery
realized by the injured plaintiff more readily available to those Minnesota
residents who had provided him with the medical and related services
necessitated by his injuries. Plaintiff may have received such services
from Minnesota doctors, hospitals, ambulance operators, pharmacists,
and, possibly, therapeutic device suppliers. Would such Minnesota residents require that protection of their fees which might be afforded by
litigation in Minnesota? First, it should be noted that, even assuming a
need for such protection, that need provides at best only a secondary and
rather limited interest on the part of the state in asserting jurisdiction in
the primary case. Certainly the secondary claims of resident medical and
service suppliers should not dominate a decision as to the propriety of
asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an action brought
by a nonresident plaintiff. More specifically, so far as hospitals are concerned, experience indicates that they need no assistance in the form of
local litigation of the injured plaintiff's case to collect their bills for services rendered. Evidence of appropriate hospitalization insurance or payment in full is virtually a condition precedent to discharge. As for the
physicians and the medical or medication suppliers, protection seems
equally unnecessary, although for other reasons. To the extent that physicians and medical suppliers have not been paid in full, they possess a
very practical means of effecting payment or assurance of payment.
Plaintiff's counsel, in the preparation of his case, will require bills from
each and medical reports from the physicians. Common practice dictates
that if the physicians are to cooperate with counsel they are to receive
assurance of payment in full of any unpaid fees from any judgment or
settlement achieved for plaintiff. Cooperation from the physicians is a
requisite to adequate preparation and successful trial of plaintiff's case.
While medical suppliers may not be as essential to plaintiff's case as the
physicians, it would be a foolhardy lawyer who risked their displeasure
by failing to assure them of payment. The same could be said of anyone
providing services necessitated by plaintiff's injury. Thus, practical considerations suggest that litigation of plaintiff's case in the state where
plaintiff suffered injury is not necessary to protect the interests of unpaid
local residents who rendered services to the plaintiff.
Since neither conduct regulation nor protection of local service suppredicated upon the provision of a convenient local forum for plaintiff has been suggested
earlier herein.
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pliers seems to explain the court's near willingness to assert jurisdiction
in Williams, it may prove helpful to determine why the nonresident plaintiff chose the Minnesota forum. Perhaps the question may be put more
specifically by inquiring why plaintiff chose to sue in Minnesota rather
than his home state, California. Although California has no long-arm
statute in the modern sense of that phrase, it has treated its classic "doing
business" statute as permitting jurisdiction over foreign corporations to
the maximum extent permissible under due process, i.e., where there are
sufficient minimum contacts between defendant and forum so that the
assertion of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."0 In Williams, California's only "contact" may
have been plaintiff's residence there. It has been submitted earlier herein
that that fact alone should be deemed sufficient to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. If that submission be accepted, is there any justification for permitting the plaintiff to select some
forum other than his or the defendant's home forum? Again, the reasons
underlying plaintiff's selection of the Minnesota forum
may prove helpful in answering that question. It is probably a fair assumption that one
of the most substantial of those reasons was the availability in Minnesota
of witnesses, lay and expert. Those witnesses, necessary for plaintiff to
sustain his evidentiary burden of proving liability and damages, presumably were for the most part residents of Minnesota. The availability of
those witnesses in Minnesota, a marked convenience to the plaintiff, may
have outweighed the convenience of trial at plaintiff's residence, even if
California were to assert jurisdiction in such a case. Since it was convenience to the presumably wronged plaintiff which led to the earlier conclusion that the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
by a court in plaintiff's home state should be deemed constitutionally
appropriate, a greater convenience to the plaintiff arising out of trial
in some other forum ought to be considered in determining the constitutional propriety of the assertion of jurisdiction by that other forum. In
Williams, the convenience accorded plaintiff by trial in California would
be the avoidance of those burdens inherent in litigation in a foreign court;
the convenience accorded plaintiff by trial in Minnesota would be the
avoidance of the burden of getting the Minnesota lay and expert witnesses
to California. It would seem that the plaintiff (still the presumably
wronged party) should be permitted to determine which of those alternative burdens he wishes to avoid. Convenience to the plaintiff, the factor
found to be most basic to the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant under existing long-arm statutes and under the more liberal
reading of due process earlier suggested as justifying the assertion of
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant by plaintiff's home forum in
all transitory causes of action, suggests further that plaintiff be permitted
80. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958),
construing CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 411(2).
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to have his action heard in a forum other than his (or defendant's) home
forum.
In Elkhart, as in Williams, it would seem appropriate to conclude that
the assertion of jurisdiction by the court in Alabama was not compelled
by a conduct-regulating motive. Although the court stated that "it is apparent that a state has a substantial interest in providing a forum to
redress tortious injuries committed within its borders by non-residents," 8
the court saw fit to negate explicitly the Hess emphasis on.'dangerous"
activities:
We do not feel that this interest is limited to torts arising from
dangerous activities. The concept of what is "dangerous" is a
slippery one at best, and in our view, the due process clause does
not require such nice distinctions.82
By eliminating the necessity of "dangerous" activity as a basis for jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court presumably diminished
the need for conduct regulation by the forum. If the conduct within the
forum is not dangerous, the forum's interest in regulating that conduct
should be reduced. If the activity within the forum is not dangerous, and
if the plaintiff is a nonresident of the forum, just what is the interest of
the forum in asserting jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant? It is
submitted that the basic interest lies in providing the plaintiff-resident
or nonresident-with a convenient forum. In Elkhart, as in Williams, the
plaintiff saw fit to choose a forum other than his home forum. Why?
Again, one must conclude that, assuming plaintiff's home forum (Wisconsin) would have asserted jurisdiction over defendant, plaintiff elected to
bear the inconvenience of a foreign court rather than the inconvenience
of securing the presence of witnesses to the Alabama airplane crash at
a trial in Wisconsin.
In Rosenblatt, the plaintiff, a Maine corporation, saw fit to bring suit
against defendant, a United States citizen apparently residing in Rome,
in New York pursuant to that state's long-arm statute. Why New York
and not Maine? First, Maine has no long-arm statute. 83 Consequently,
plaintiff's choice of forums was between Italy and some state forum in
the United States which would assert jurisdiction. New York's long-arm
statute was by its terms applicable to the facts, since that was where the
alleged tort occurred. Moreover, because New York was the situs of the
tort, presumably plaintiff's witnesses would be more readily accessible to
a court sitting in New York than one in any other state. Once more, the
81. Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 1965).
82. Id.
83. It does have a nonresident automobile or aircraft operator's statute, ME. RaV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, § 1911 (1954), and the classic "doing business" statute applicable to foreign
corporations, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 591 (1954).
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selection of a forum other than plaintiff's home forum seems to have been
suggested by convenience-plaintiff's convenience. Despite Mr. Justice
Goldberg's assertion that the relative convenience (or inconvenience) to
plaintiff or defendant did not "relate . . . to jurisdiction in a constitutional sense," it is difficult to discover any other appropriate basis for
New York's assertion of jurisdiction. 4 As noted earlier, such jurisdiction
was not a requisite to regulation of conduct in New York, since any court
which heard the action would apply New York's dispositive law to the
extent justified by New York's interest therein. Since the plaintiff was a
Maine corporation, New York had no interest in providing a local forum
for a resident plaintiff, and no such interest was suggested by Mr. Justice
Goldberg despite plaintiff's "substantial plant in New York." The "interest" served by New York's assertion of jurisdiction seems not to have
been an interest of New York, but rather of the plaintiff-convenience.
And, it is submitted, that interest should be deemed to justify constitutionally the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
That conclusion may be fortified by considering a hypothetical situation somewhat different from the operative facts alleged in Rosenblatt.
Assume that defendant had never entered New York; rather, his alleged
part in the conspiracy was carried out wholly in Italy. Assume, too, that
plaintiff, a Maine resident, had no plant or other facility in New York,
and the biological cultures and confidential information allegedly stolen
had been taken from plaintiff's facility in Maine. Were plaintiff to sue
defendant in Maine, the assertion of jurisdiction over defendant would
be constitutionally appropriate pursuant to the due process test opted
for earlier in this article: the forum would have an appropriate interest
in providing a convenient forum for its resident plaintiff allegedly injured
by the nonresident defendant. Certainly Maine would be a more convenient forum for plaintiff than would Italy. What if plaintiff elected to sue
defendant in New York instead of Maine? Such a selection on the part of
plaintiff would indicate that for one or more reasons plaintiff considered
New York a more convenient forum than Maine. If providing plaintiff
a convenient forum is the basic reason for asserting jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant (and it has been suggested herein that it is), plaintiff should be permitted to select the forum he deems most convenient
from among New York, Maine, and Italy.
It was submitted earlier that plaintiff's convenience justified the assertion of jurisdiction by plaintiff's home forum over a nonresident defendant in any transitory cause of action. It is suggested now that plaintiff's
84. Even as early as International Shoe, the Court expressed some concern over convenience and inconvenience in determining the constitutional propriety of the assertion of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: "An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business
is relevant in this connection." International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317 (1945).
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convenience justifies the assertion of jurisdiction by any state court
selected by plaintiff over a nonresident defendant in a transitory cause
of action. It is suggested, too, that the forum selected by plaintiff need
not be the state in which defendant's conduct occurred, or, indeed, a state
having any contact with the cause of action other than its selection by
plaintiff. Of course, in many cases, plaintiff's convenience may lead to the
selection of a forum in the state where defendant's conduct or the immediate consequences thereof occurred, as in Williams, Elkhart, and Rosenblatt. However, since it has been determined that the state wherein such
conduct or consequences occurred has no overriding interest in asserting
jurisdiction, it is submitted that plaintiff's selection of a forum should
not be so limited constitutionally.
If plaintiff is permitted to select a forum of convenience, what adverse
consequences may be imposed upon defendant? Plaintiff might select a
forum which imposes undue inconvenience upon defendant in terms of
the availability of defendant's witnesses, of the possibility of a view of a
critical area (if such a need seems likely), or of the docket condition of
the court selected. In such a case, defendant would have available the
relief of a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss or transfer, depending upon whether the court were state or federal.8"
Plaintiff might select a forum having a body of dispositive law uniquely
favorable to plaintiff's asserted claim. But selection of such a forum will
not necessarily result in the application of that dispositive law. Rather,
the forum, by the selection or creation of its own appropriate indicative
laws, will apply the dispositive law of that state having the paramount
interest in each of the issues of the case.86 It might be asserted that the
forum would avoid the application of the dispositive law of sister states
by (1) labeling that law "procedural" rather than "substantive," (2)
finding that law to be offensive to a basic public policy of the forum, or
(3) simply refusing to afford recognition to such law.
Should the forum attempt to avoid application of sister state law by
labeling it "procedural," the court's determination would be subject to
validation in several ways. The "substance-procedure" dichotomy,
tenuous at best, is not likely to be sustained if it results in a withholding
of effect from otherwise applicable sister state law likely to affect the
outcome of the litigation in a manner not within the control of the parties
or their counsel after the operative facts have occurred. The full faith and
credit clause is available as protection against such a result.8 7 Moreover,
85. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co., 375 U.S. 71 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948).
86. See text and cases cited at note 69 supra.
87. But cf. Seidelson & Bowler, Determination of Family Status in the Administration
of FederalActs: A Choice of Law Problem for Federal Agencies and Courts, 33 GEO. WASH.
L. Ray. 863, 884 (1965).
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if the forum is, indeed, without any contacts with the operative facts, it
is unlikely to feel any compulsion to supplant applicable foreign law with
the forum's own law. The court's disinterest in the facts and the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit would seem to militate effectively
against an improper evasion of applicable law of a sister state, with a
consequent change in outcome. To the extent that the foreign law is
"procedural" in the sense that it lacks substantial potential to affect the
outcome of the case or lends itself to the control of parties and their counsel, its avoidance by the forum imposes no substantial adverse effect upon
defendant."8
If the forum attempts to avoid application of sister state law on the
ground that it is offensive to a public policy of the forum, the court's
effort will invite a constitutional argument. Should the court so refuse to
recognize otherwise applicable law of a sister state which would be available as a defense to defendant, its refusal would violate both the full faith
and credit and due process clauses."9 Should the court so refuse to recognize otherwise applicable law of a sister state essential to plaintiff's cause
of action, its refusal might well violate full faith and credit; 9 0 perhaps
even more significant, a forum having such a public policy is not very
likely to be selected by plaintiff. Its selection certainly would not jeopardize defendant. If the plaintiff should attempt to avoid a basic public
policy of the state having the most significant interest in some issue of
the case by selecting a forum lacking such a policy, his effort would prove
fruitless once the forum looked to an appropriate indicative law to determine which dispositive law should decide the issue; the forum's indicative law will refer the court to the dispositive law (including the basic
public policy) of that state having ,the most significant interest in that
particular issue.
Should the forum simply refuse to afford recognition to applicable law
of a sister state, its refusal without justification would violate the full
faith and credit clause." And, once more, bearing in mind that the forum
88. Apparently, such a characterization of "procedural law" would pass muster now
even under the relatively restricted view of procedural law imposed on federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
89. Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Insurance Co., 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944). See
Sumner, The Status of Public Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 24 (1955); Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal . . . Or Two, 31 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 462,
475 (1962).
90. Seidelson, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: An Instrument for Resolution of
Intranational Conflicts Problems, 32 GEo. WAsir. L. REv. 554, 563 (1964).
91. For the proposition that the clause is applicable to decisional as well as statutory
law, see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,45 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 12 (1945); Kramer,
Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RuTGERs L. REv. 523, 549, n.86 (1959) ;

Seidelson, supra note 89, at 465; but cf. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments
and Public Acts-A Historical Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 33, 75 (1957).
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is without contacts with the operative facts of the case, there would seem
to be no apparent motive for a groundless refusal to apply the appropriate
law of a sister state.
Of course, plaintiff might select a forum having an indicative law which
would refer the court to some dispositive law favorable to plaintiff's case.
As an example, suppose that plaintiff sues defendant for injuries received
while plaintiff was riding as a guest in defendant's automobile. Suppose,
too, that the injuries were suffered in State X, a state having a guest
statute. In determining whether or not the guest statute was applicable,
some courts might utilize lex loci delicti as the indicative law and look
to the law of State X, 2 while other courts might favor an indicative law
which referred them to the dispositive law of the state where the hostguest relationship was entered into or where defendant's automobile is
normally garaged and insured, 93 some state other than State X and one
having no guest statute. Obviously, if he is able, plaintiff will select a
forum utilizing the latter indicative law, thus obviating the necessity of
proving that defendant's degree of culpability exceeded negligence.
Should that kind of freedom of selection be deemed violative of defendant's due process rights? It is submitted that it should not. So long as
the forum's indicative law is bottomed on an appropriate contact with or
interest in the particular issue involved on the part of that state whose
dispositive law is selected to resolve the issue--for example, the state
where the relationship arose or the automobile is insured-application of
the dispositive law of that state indicated by the forum's indicative law
violates no constitutional right of the defendant. After all, application of
that same dispositive law by a court sitting in defendant's home state, in
plaintiff's home state, or in State X, would do no violence to due process.
Admittedly, allowing plaintiff to select his forum may enhance substantially the likelihood that the forum will eschew lex loci delicti in favor of
a more interest oriented indicative law in the hypothetical situation posed.
But so long as that indicative law results in the application of the dispositive law of a state having a legitimate interest in the issue, defendant
will not have suffered a deprivation of due process. Should the forum's
indicative law result in the application of the dispositive law of a state
having no legitimate interest in the issue, application of that state's law
would offend due process whether the forum be in defendant's home state,
plaintiff's home state, State X, or any other state.
Consequently, one is led to the conclusion that permitting the plaintiff
to select a forum of convenience will not result in undue "inconvenience"
to the defendant, as that word would be contemplated in a forum non
92. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
93. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
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conveniens motion--otherwise the motion would be granted-or the application of a body of law uniquely and improperly favorable to plaintiff's
cause of action. What other "undue" hardships might be visited upon the
defendant?
It is certainly conceivable that plaintiff would select a forum of convenience in which verdicts in causes of action such as his tend to be high.
Does this possibility lead to the conclusion that permitting the selected
forum to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant violates due
process? First, there is some authority for the proposition that selection
of a forum wherein jurors "live on terms of intimacy" 4 with large verdicts may be subject to a forum non conveniens motion by defendant.
To the extent that such a motion would be granted on that ground, defendant is afforded the opportunity of protection against the "high verdict" forum. Frankly, the author is not persuaded that such a ground
justifies a forum non conveniens transfer or dismissal. Selection of a
forum based on past jury verdicts in similar cases is, at best, a calculated
gamble. The reaction of a jury as measured in dollars is necessarily
subject to the unique facts in each case, the individual jurors hearing the
case, and the ability of counsel representing the litigants.
Some thought might be given to why one area would be considered a
"low verdict" jurisdiction, and another, a "high verdict" jurisdiction.
Probably most lawyers would tend to regard rural or semi-rural areas as
low-verdict areas, and urban areas as high-verdict areas. Why? Frequently it is said because those residing in rural areas are not accustomed
to thinking in terms of large dollar amounts. To the extent that this may
be so, it probably reflects a lower cost of living in rural areas than exists
in urban areas. Presumably, then, a rural plaintiff suffering physical injury will incur a lower dollar amount of "specials" than would an urban
plaintiff similarly injured. If the rural plaintiff is permitted to have his
case heard by an urban jury in a forum of his choice, that jury will receive evidence of those smaller losses. That evidence--different from that
likely to be presented by the urban plaintiff-may be anticipated to
result in a different and lower verdict.
Finally, the potential of plaintiff's selection of a high-verdict forum
should be kept in proper perspective. The situation under consideration here is one in which plaintiff resides in one state and defendant
in another. Under existing law, plaintiff may bring his action in defendant's home state, where, presumably, defendant is amenable to
personal service. Defendant's home state may be a high verdict area.
In addition, under existing long-arm statutes, plaintiff may bring his
action in his home state if it has a long-arm statute applicable to the
facts of the case and if defendant has "minimum contacts" with the
94. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947).
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state, or in some other state having a long-arm statute applicable to
the facts and with which defendant has "minimum contacts." Any one
or more of those states may be high-verdict areas. Consequently, permitting plaintiff to bring his action in a forum of convenience of his
choice, in many cases, may not provide plaintiff with a unique opportunity of trial in a high-verdict area. In those cases where it may, plaintiff will be compelled to choose from among his home forum, the most
likely forum of convenience, the state in which witnesses are available,
a likely forum of convenience, or the high-verdict state. Selection of
the high-verdict state, a speculative gamble at best, would be made
at the cost of sacrificing the convenience of trial at home or where the
witnesses, lay and expert, are readily available. Moreover, plaintiff's
selection of the high-verdict state would be subject to challenge by
defendant through a forum non conveniens motion based on appropriate grounds. Two such grounds suggest themselves. First, if the
selected forum should prove to be a consistently high-verdict forum,
it will probably become an extremely popular forum of choice. That
very popularity, resulting in an unusually congested court docket,
would provide a basis for a forum non conveniens transfer or dismissal.95 Second, if plaintiff's selection can be justified on no basis of
convenience other than the convenience of a high-verdict forum, and
defendant is inconvenienced by the selection, it may be fair to presume
that defendant's forum non conveniens motion will be received sympathetically by the court. The potential of trial in a high-verdict state
seems neither so likely to be realized nor so certain to impose adverse
consequences on the defendant to justify the conclusion that it would
offend due process.
It is submitted that convenience to the plaintiff is the basic justification for the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
In most cases, that convenience will best be served by permitting plaintiff to sue defendant in plaintiff's home forum. In cases where that
convenience would best be served by permitting plaintiff to sue defendant in some other forum, plaintiff should be permitted the forum of
his choice. Plaintiff's selection of the forum should be conclusive evidence of his forum of convenience, subject only to an appropriate
forum non conveniens motion by defendant. In this manner, plaintiff's
convenience will be properly accommodated, and defendant will be
afforded the opportunity of litigation before a competent court without
having imposed upon him undue inconvenience as that phrase is understood in the context of a forum non conveniens motion. It is suggested that this view of the constitutional propriety of the assertion of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in transitory causes of action
is consonant with the essential reason for such jurisdiction-plaintiff's
95. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 94.
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convenience-and lends itself to ready application in varying factual
situations. Moreover, it does not in fact deprive the defendant of liberty or property without due process of law. Thus, substantive due
process should be deemed satisfied in any case wherein plaintiff and
defendant are residents of different states, the cause of action is transitory, and plaintiff's selection of a forum is capable of withstanding
a forum non conveniens motion.

